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The Moon Treaty, on adoption, will establish the principle 
that the moon and its natural resources are the common heritage 
of mankind. The establishment of an international regime is con-
templated to govern exploitation of such resources with "equit-
able sharing" by all States in the benefits derived from those 
resources, with "special consideration" for developing countries 
and countries contributing to the exploitation. This paper ex-
amines the apprehension of private enterprise to invest funds in a 
moon activity requiring sharing of profits with States that had not 
shared in the risks involved. In light of the Treaty's negotiated 
history, conclusions made are that the nature of the sharing has 
not yet been determined; that such must await a subsequent 
separate treaty negotiation for the governing international regime 
when exploitation "is about to become feasible," an eventuality 
perhaps thirty or more years from now; that in the interim, there 
is no moratorium on exploitation and States may authorize their 
governmental and nongovernmental entities to undertake ex-
ploitation of the moon's resources. Private sector planning for and 
investment in commercial space activities, with Government sup-
port, is encouraged. 
IL INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE 
ACTIVITIES 
A. The Space Law Treaties 
The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (TOM), on December 5, 1979, was 
recommended by resolution of the United Nations General 
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Assembly for signature and ratification.1 Like its three pre-
decessor treaties formulated by the Legal Subcommittee of the 
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS) since adoption in 1967 of the Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities ·of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies2 
(OST), the TOM is an expansion of principles embraced in the 
basic OST governing space activity. The TOM carries forward the 
OST objectives of international cooperation in space activities, 
with all nations to share in the benefits of space exploration 
without regard to their level of economic or scientific develop-
ment.3 
B. Freedom from Sovereignty 
The appeal of the OST for international accord in exploration 
and use by all States was strengthened by the omission of the 
historical concept applicable to discovery and exploration of land 
masses on Earth, viz: the obtaining of sovereignty upon "effective 
occupation" over a terra nullius. In lieu thereof, the OST proclaim-
ed, "Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is 
not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by 
means of use, or occupation or by any other means." 4 Without this 
provision, States which established settlements on celestial bodies 
or otherwise in space might well be reluctant to then surrender 
1. G.A. RES. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 46) 77, U.N. Doc. A/Res/34/68 (1979) 
[generally known as the "Moon Treaty," hereinafter cited as the TOM]. The text of the Treaty 
is contained in the Annex. 
2. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967, 18 
U.S.T. 2410, T.l.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Oct. 10, 1967) [popularly known as 
the "1967 Treaty on Outer Space," hereinafter cited as OST]. The three interim predecessor 
treaties were: Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the 
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, done Apr. 22, 196~. 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.l.A.S. 
No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (effective Dec. 5, 1968); Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects, done March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.l.A.S. No. 7762 
(effective Oct. 9, 1973); Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 
done Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.l.A.S. No. 8480, (effective Sept. 15, 1976). 
3. See OST, supra note 2, at Preamble, art. I; TOM, supra note 1, at Preamble, arts. 
2, 4. 
4. OST, note 2 supra, at art. II. For a discussion of application of prior principles to 
space discovery and settlement in the absence of an international accord precluding vesting 
of sovereignty, see M. Menter, Jurisdiction Over Land Masses in Space, address at the 
American Rocket Society Space Law and Sociology Conference, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace Building, New York City (Apr. 24, 1962). 
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whatever inchoate sovereignty rights accrued by such settle-
ments. Many an armed conflict emanated from conflicting sover-
eignty claims on Earth; this possibility in space was to be avoided. 
The time to resolve this foreseeable problem was before such 
space exploration and settlement could occur. 
The TOM contains a similar recital against national ap-
propriation of the moon.5 While some writers and States had con-
tended that the OST Article II prohibition would preclude ex-
ploitation of the moon's natural resources, the prevailing view ap-
pears to permit such exploitation.6 It is believed that the intent of 
this provision was to preclude application of the historical concept 
of sovereignty attaching to exploration and establishment of domi-
nion over newly discovered portions of the Earth. 
Ill THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN SPACE 
A. Space Communications 
Private sector commercial space activities by U.S. companies 
followed the enactment by the U. S. Congress of the Communica-
tion Satellite Act of 1962.7 The act established the Communica-
tions Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) which was authorized to 
create and operate, or in conjunction with foreign governments or 
business entities to operate "a commercial communications satel-
lite system."8 
B. Remote Sensing 
Private sector ownership and management of a civil opera-
tional land remote sensing activity is currently being studied by 
the U. S. Government. Planning and development responsibilities · 
therefor were assigned by the President on November 20, 1979 to 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of 
the U.S. Department of Commerce.9 On June 20, 1980, the NOAA · 
issued a document setting forth issues and options being con-
5. TOM, supra note 1, at art. 11, para. 2. 
6. 1 MANUAL OF SPACE LAW 264 (N. Jasentuliyana, R. Lee eds. 1979). 
7. 47 u.s.c. § 701 (1976). 
8. Id. at § 731. 
9. The Nov. 20, 1979 presidential directive was premised upon an Interagency Task 
Force study "Private Sector Involvement in Civil Remote Sensing," dated June 15, 1979. 
The Nov. 20, 1979 White House Release is reprinted as "Attachment A" to the NOAA June 
20, 1980 Doc. "Planning for a Civil Operational and Remote Sensing System: A Discussion of 
Issues and Options." 
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sidered by the Federal Administration in the development of its 
1982 fiscal year budget and legislative program.10 
C. Congressional and Executive Interest in Future Space 
Endeavors 
In the U. S. Congress 96th session, both houses of Congress 
have held hearings in good part to ascertain and encourage 
private sector involvement in space activities11 and to evaluate the 
current U. S. Civil Space Policy. The Policy, announced by the 
President on October 11, 1978, increased participation by t}:te 
private sector in space enterprises. Among other recitals, the 
announcement stated that the Policy was to "confirm our support 
of the continued development of a legal regime in space that would 
assure its safe and peaceful use for the benefit of mankind."12 
There is no doubt that the Administration and the Congress 
desire to assure that the private sector, under Government aegis, 
will share in such space endeavors as envisaged by the concise 
apropos remarks of Ambassador Peter Jankowitsch, Chairman of 
the UN COPUOS,13 at the opening of the Committee's 1979 ses-
sion: 
We are now seriously considering daily flights to orbit which 
might serve and supply large technical facilities such as research 
laboratories, astronomical laboratories, earth resources obser-
vatories, manufacturing facilities or communication centres. We 
are also considering expanding direct-to-home television broad-
casting through-out the world; and erecting large structures in 
space, stabilizing them and moving them about. The possible early 
demonstration of a large structure that could be part of a large 
10. Id. at 119. Legislative proposals under contemplation include a bill to establish the 
institutional framework and governmental financial assistance for eventual private sector 
ownership and operation of a civil operational land remote sensing system. 
11. See The National Space and Aeronautical Policy Act of 1979, S. 212, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1979); Space Flight Policy Act of 1979, S. 244, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Earth 
Resources Information Corporation Act of 1979, S. 875, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Space 
Industrialization Act of 1980, H.R. 7 412, 96th Cong .. 2d Sess. (1980). 
12. White House Fact Sheet of Oct. 11, 1978, reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON COM-
MERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., SPACE LAW-SELECTED BASIC 
DocUMENTS (2d ed.) 561 (1978). A White House Press Release of June 20, 1978 announced 
the Committee's establishment within the Executive Office of the President with the objec-
tive among others, of "[the encouragement of) domestic commercial exploitation of space 
capabilities and systems for economic benefit .. . ".Id. at 559. 
13. United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [hereinafter cited 
as COPUOS]. 
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solar experiment is under active consideration. And finally, we 
are examining the possibility of setting up larger, earth-like com-
munities several hundred thousand miles up in space.14 
D. Activities in the Moon and other Celestial Bodies 
217 
The TOM expressly recognizes that the private sector may 
engage in activities on the moon. In language patterned after Arti-
cle VI of the OST, the TOM states that "non-governmental en-
tities" under the jurisdiction of a State Party to the Treaty may 
engage in national activities on the moon. However, such activities 
are to be "only under the authority and continuing supervision of 
the appropriate State Party."15 
It should be noted that by reason of express recitals in the in-
itial article of the TOM, its provisions relating to the moon are 
also applicable to other celestial bodies other than the Earth, in-
cluding "orbits around or other trajectories to or around" the 
moon.16 However, such orbits and trajectories "do not include tra-
jectories and orbits of space .objects in earth orbit only and trajec-
tories of space objects between the earth and such orbits."11 In 
this paper, all references to the moon shall likewise be deemed to 
be applicable to other celestial bodies, unless it is otherwise ap-
parent from the context. 
IV. EXPLOITATION OF MOON RESOURCES 
A. The Common Heritage Principle 
The provisions of the TOM of most significance to commercial 
operations under the Treaty concern the exploitation of the natural 
14. Report of COPUOS, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 30, U.N. Doc. A/34/20 (1979). 
15. TOM, supra note 1, at art. 14, para. 1. The wording of the prior Art. VI, OST was 
taken from para. 5of18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.15) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964). Declaration 
of Legal Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space. The wording was that proffered by the U.S.S.R. except for substitution on the sug-
gestion of the U.S. Delegate of the term "non-governmental entities" for "non-governmental 
bodies corporate" 18 U.N. GAOR _, _, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.24 (1963). In a discus-
sion leading to the formulation of this principle, the Soviet Delegate remarked: 
The Soviet delegation considers it essential to point out that in this field it would 
be possible to consider the question of not excluding from the declaration possibili-
ty of activity in outer space by private companies, on the condition that such ac-
tivity would be subject to the control of the appropriate State and the State would 
bear international responsibility for it. 
16. Id. at art. l, para. 2. 
17. Id. at Preamble; Report of the COPUOS, supra note 13, at 11, para. 63. 
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resources of the moon. It was after a stalemate of seven years that 
a compromise permitted the attainment of a consensus on the pre-
sent draft. This compromise is contained in Article 11, which 
states in its initial paragraph: "The moon and its natural resources 
are the common heritage of mankind, which finds its expression in 
the provisions of this Agreement, in particu/,ar in paragraph 5 of 
this article."18 (emphasis added). The compromise provision was the 
addition of the emphasized wording purporting to limit the deriva-
tion or meaning of "common heritage of mankind" to the TOM, 
rather than to the use of such phrase elsewhere. 
A brief review of the development of the common heritage of 
mankind concept (hereinafter referred to as the "CHM") in the 
TOM may be helpful. The 1971 UN General Assembly session re-
quested COPUOS and "its Legal Subcommittee to consider, as a 
priority matter, the question of the elaboration of a draft treaty 
concerning the moon.19 In its request, the Resolution took note of 
"A Draft Treaty Concerning the Moon" submitted by the USSR to 
the UN General Assembly's First Committee.20 This draft, 
however, was devoid of the CHM. Such concept had previously 
been proposed by Argentina during the 1970 COPUOS Legal Sub-
committee Session in a proposal concerned only with the use of 
the natural resources of the moon and other celestial bodies.21 The 
concept was adopted by the United States in the draft proposal it 
submitted in April 197222 at the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee Ses-
sion which was considering the desirability of a TOM pursuant to 
the request of the UN General Assembly. The CHM was concisely 
stated in the U. S. draft as "The natural resources of the Moon and 
other celestial bodies shall be the common heritage of all 
mankind." 23 
It would appear that the U.S., at the time of the submittal of 
the CHM had in mind the similar recital in the proposed Law of 
the Sea (LOS) seabed treaty. On May 3, 1972, the U.S. Represen-
tative to the Legal Subcommittee in a statement concerning the 
natural resources of the moon and other celestial bodies stated: 
"This [CHM] would parallel policy proposed by President Nixon 
18. TOM, supra note l, at art. 11, para. 1. 
19. G.A. RES. 2779, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) 28, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1972). 
20. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L/ 568. (?) 
21. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.71 and Corr. 1. (?) 
22. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2(Xl)WP12 Rev. 1 (1972). 
23. Id. at para. 1. 
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two years ago ... that all nations should regard the resources of 
the seabed ... as the common heritage of mankind." 24 
The U.S. introduction of the CHM met with mixed reception. 
The USSR opposed the CHM25 until it accepted as as a com-
promise the more limiting revised Article 11 which contained the 
additional circumscription to the CHM: "which finds its expression 
in the provisions of this agreement, in particular in paragraph 5 of 
this article."26 Paragraph 5 provides: 
States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish 
an international regime, including appropriate procedures, to 
govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon as 
such exploitation is about to become feasible. This provision 
shall be implemented in accordance with Article 18 of this 
Agreement.27 
B. The International Regime 
The international regime's main purposes as recited in Arti-
cle 11, paragraph 7, are the orderly, safe development and rational 
24. Statement by U.S. Representative Herbert Reis, contained in U.S. Mission 
release, Geneva, Switzerland, May 3, 1972, p.6. In an exchange of views, with the U.S.S.R. 
during the following year session of the Legal Subcommittee as to the legal substance of the 
CHM, the Argentine delegate observed that the UN General Assembly Resolution 2749 25 
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) adopted without dissenting vote, 
was "proof of the existence of this legal viewpoint common to all States, irrespective of 
their special internal features, their philosophical ideas or their policies" __ U.N. GAOR, 
__ , 29-31, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/115 (1973). The referenced R~solution in part declared: "1. 
The seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion ... as well as [its] resources ... are the common heritage of mankind." 25 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971). 
25. See U.S.S.R. Working Paper, 28 U.N. GAOR _, _, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/101, 
para. 21 (1973) reprinted in 1977 COPUOS Legal Subcommittee Report, 32 U.N. GAOR 
_, _, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, Annex I, 11-12 (1977). The U.S.S.R. favored substitution 
of the prior used and understood phraseology "common province of all mankind," observing 
that under the OST celestial bodies "are available for the undivided and common use of all 
States, but not jointly owned by them. This is the essential feature of international law." 
In 1976, Ambassador Piradov of the U.S.S.R., at the COPUOS, observed: "First, we 
are genuinely convinced that such a proposal is premature in the absence of the necessary 
objective foundations and factual material for it. Secondly, we have referred to the juridical 
and political vagueness and lack of specificity in the concept which has been put forward." 
31 U.N. GAOR _, _, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV 158, 8-10 (1976). 
26. TOM, supra note l, at art. 11, para. 1. 
27. Art. 18 provides that the question of whether exploration is about to become feasi-
ble will be an agenda item of the UN General Assembly ten years after the TOM has come 
into force; further such question may also be considered by a review committee after the 
TOM has been in effect for five years, upon the request of one-third of the States Parties to 
the TOM with the concurrence of a majority of the States Parties. TOM, supra note 1, art. 
18. 
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management of the moon's natural resources, the expansion of op-
portunities for the use of such resources, and an "equitable shar-
ing" in the "benefits derived from the resources" by all States 
Parties, with "special consideration" being given to the efforts of 
those countries which have contributed either directly or indirect-
ly to the exploration of the moon as well as to "the interests and 
needs of the developing countries."28 
1. PRIVATE SECTOR CONSIDERATION 
Intrinsic to the consideration of the international regime are 
questions relating to authorization for exploitation of the moon's 
natural resources, the nature and limitations of the international 
regime, and when such regime and exploitation may come into ef-
fect. In the United States, serious consideration is being accorded 
to assertions that the CHM will lessen the incentive of the private 
sector to risk capital investment in space ventures involving ex-
ploitation of the moon's resources. The purpose of any commercial 
venture being financial gain, the indefiniteness of the CHM is said 
to render the possibility of such gain as too speculative and uncer-
tain, including an unacceptable possible interpretation for sharing 
profits from risk capital investments with parties that did not 
share such risk. 
It must be recognized that unlike the seabed whose resources 
are readily identifiable and obtainable, many years of effort-
perhaps thirty or more-and unknown costs will be expended 
before exploitation of the moon can be determined as "about to 
become feasible." 29 
28. TOM, supra note l, art. 11, para. 7. 
29. Charles Sheffield, President, American Astronautical Society and Vice-President, 
Earth Satellite Corporation, in recent testimony stated "these parameters may not be 
known well enough for another thirty or forty years to encourage a private investment 
group to operation on a for-profit basis in the field of off-earth mineral exploration." The 
Moon Treaty, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and Space of the 
Senate Comm. On Commerce, Science and Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1980) 
[hereinafter cited as The Moon Treaty Hearings]. Frosch, Robert, NASA Administrator, at 
the same Hearing testified that "[a]ny exploitation of extraterrestrial resources will require 
the development of new major technologies, ... that planetary exploration will be required 
in order to fill the gaps in our knowledge of the nature and distribution of extraterrestrial 
materials." Id. at 37. He also observed that "a number of evolutionary steps of technology 
would be required to accomplish a demonstration of a Space Materials System." Id. at 38. 
For an excellent presentation of lunar resources available, materials separation and 
processing to be undertaken, see testimony of Edward Bock, Project Engineer at Convair 
Div., General Dynamics Corp., and of Dr. James R. Arnold, Department of Chemistry, Univ. 
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2. THE MORATORIUM ISSUE 
Other questions have been raised as to the nature and 
authority of the international regime envisaged by the TOM and 
whether a moratorium on exploitation of the moon's natural 
resources is required pending establishment and functioning of 
such regime. Further questions remain as to the possessory in-
terest of a State or its nationals to the area of the moon occupied 
during exploitation of natural resources and to the resources 
removed. 
C. Interpretation Problems 
A reading of the TOM text, without consideration of its 
negotiated history, can be misleading. TOM contains key words 
that are undefined and which may infer an unintended meaning. In 
the COPUOS and its two subcommittees, agreement on a matter 
under consideration is obtained by consensus; that is, agreement 
is not obtained until no further objection is made. As objections 
are made, piecemeal changes are suggested. While the intent of a 
change would be clear at the time made, a reader of the entire pro-
vision not having the benefit of the detailed consideration accord-
ed the total effort may readily arrive at a conclusion not in accord 
with the intent of the provision. 
With forty-seven States represented at COPUOS and its sub-
committee meetings, with each annual meeting able to allocate 
limited time for consideration of a given agenda item, with 
language difficulties sometimes occurring, and with the need to 
coordinate with home offices on changes of substance, the 
pressure for consensus on a General Assembly priority requested 
item may lead to reluctance to seek substantial revision when .a 
recited interpretation appears to provide an acceptable resolution. 
With many cooks in the kitchen, we may question the appearance of 
slowly baked pie when removed from the oven; while digestibility 
of California at La Jolla. Id. at 147-64. See also Stanley Sadin, Dep. Dir., for Special Program 
Development at NASA's Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology, address at a Space 
Law Workshop, sponsored by the Association of United States Members of the Interna-
tional Institute of Space Law, at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, "The Moon Treaty: Should the United States Become A Party?" (Washington, 
D.C. 1980). After advising of the moon's resources and the method contemplated for their 
removal and transportation, Sadin observed that the most promising present utilization en-
visioned was in construction of a Solar Power System satellite space station. He cautioned, 
however, that this would first require many years of study and research. 
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may be difficult, it may nevertheless provide the needed suste-
nance. 
1. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 
In resolving questions raised as to the interpretation of provi-
sions of a treaty or agreements incident thereto, Part III, Section 
3 of the "Interpretation of Treaties" of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties permits reference to UN documentation of the 
negotiated history and conclusion of the treaty, · including 
agreements as to its interpretation.30 It may be further noted that 
the "negotiated history" of a treaty includes "all manifestations of 
intention made during the course of negotiation ... contained in 
the official records of the conference available to negotiators."31 
30. U .N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 opened for signature, May 23, 1969, reprinted in 8 INT'L 
LEGAL MAT'Ls 679 (1969). The U.S. has not yet become a party to the Vienna Convention; 
however, its provisions here applicable reflect customary international law; and are as 
follows: 
Article 31 
General rule of interpretation 
(1) A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose. 
(2) The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the par-
ties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with 
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty. 
(3) There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpreta-
tion of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties. 
(4) A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended. 
Article 32 
Supplementary means of interpretation 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine 
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 147 
(1965). 
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2. CONTENDING INTERPRET A TIO NS 
While the CHM, on introduction into the TOM, may have con-
templated the concept as used in the LOS seabed treaty, it is clear 
that the revision accepted on the last day of the 1979 COPUOS 
session removed the LOS use as a binding interpretation and 
restricted the CHM meaning to the provisions of the TOM, par-
ticularly Article 11, paragraph 5. The question, however, remains 
as to what the latter may embrace. It will be recalled that in the 
referenced paragraph 5, the Parties "undertake to establish an in-
ternational regime ... to govern the exploitation of the natural 
resources of the Moon as such exploitation is about to become 
feasible." 32 Further, by paragraph 7(d), Article 11, the Parties to 
the TOM agreed to an "equitable sharing" in the benefits derived 
from such resources, as previously related herein.33 
Views have been expressed by respected authors as to their 
belief of the meaning of the CHM as used in the TOM, ranging 
from application of the LOS purported use of CHM 34 (common 
ownership and profit sharing) to meaning the international 
cooperation that exists today in the equitable sharing of benefits 
of space applications with the international community.35 Richard 
G. Darman, a lecturer in Public Policy and Management at the 
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, in 
discussing Article 11 of the TOM, observed that the CHM "in and 
of itself, is but a vague phrase"; he noted that the international 
regime is similarly without specific definition, such essentially be-
ing left to future negotiations; and that neither the TOM nor the 
LOS seabed treaty negotiating text "refers to the other or to the 
other's specific domain."36 
Ambassador Aldo A. Cocca, who, as the Representative of 
32. TOM, supra note 1, art. 11, para. 5. 
33. Id. at art. 11, para. 7(d). 
34. The Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 29, at 105-132 (testimony of L. Ratinen). 
35. U.N .. General Assembly Press Release USUN-107 (79), Nov. l, 1979 (statement 
by R.W. Petree to the U.N. General Assembly Special Political Committee in Consideration 
of the TOM draft) [hereinafter cited as Press Release]. 
Robert B. Owens, in testimony on the TOM, stated "our position in essence was that 
the common heritage concept ... would simply parallel and conform to established space 
law, especially Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty ... and that activities in such 
areas [of outer space] shall be for the benefit and interests of all countries." The Moon Trea-
ty Hearings, supra note 29, at 13. 
36. The Moori Treaty Hearings, supra note 29, at 168. 
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Argentina, first proposed the CHM at a COPUOS Legal Subcom-
mittee Session in 1970, has recently written: 
As you know, it is rather dangerous to crystallize in a defini-
tion the principle involved in a concept which is just being born 
in the new domain of Space Law, such as the 'common heritage of 
all mankind,' as it was established in the Moon Agreement. As 
the 'international regime' is concerned, I dare say it is not a mat-
ter of definition; I feel it must be the outcome of the implementa-
tion of the guidelines set forth in the agreement.37 Similar cau-
tion has been suggested by USSR38 and US 39 COPUOS delegates. 
V. THE NEED FOR LAW AND ORDER IN SPACE 
A. Avoidance of Anarchy 
The OST has assured that unlike discovery and exploration 
on Earth, a nation's sovereignty shall not attach to space, the 
moon or other celestial bodies by reason of space exploration or 
other action. With the advent of the Space Shuttle, we are at the 
threshold of a great expansion in space activities. "Anarchy in 
space could be more dangerous than anarchy on Earth," observed 
the late Justice Kenneth B. Keating.40 It is plausible that inter-
national controls be sought for the common good of all States. 
While a "regime" conceivably can be but an agreed set of govern-
37. Letter from Dr. Cocca to Mrs. Eilene Galloway, reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON 
COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, 96th CONG., 2D SESS., AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE 
ACTIVITIES OF STATES ON THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES 58 (Comm. Print 1980). 
38. Dr. Y.M. Kolossov, Alternate Head of the Soviet Delegation at the 1979 COPUOS 
session, on the last day of the session when the U.S.S.R. accepted the more limited CHM, 
observed: "Our delegation will make no hasty interpretation of the meaning behind each ar-
ticle of the new draft agreement .... " 34 U.N. GAOR __ , U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.203, at 
21 (1979). 
39. S. Neil Hosenball, who chaired the U.S. delegation at the 1979 COPUOS session, in 
response to questions at a Congressional Hearing on September 6, 1979, observed: 
The world ... may be a lot different when exploitation is proven feasible on a com-
mercial scale, and that common heritage may mean something completely dif-
ferent then .... The definition of the Law of the Sea is being hammered out in the 
implementation of the exploitation of the natural resources .... Unlike the Law of 
the Sea, where we do have some information on the investment required where 
we do have technology and facilities ... that can harvest the resources [of the 
seabed]. We're a long way from that in space activities .... So ... it should not 
have a definition at this time. I don't think we know enough in a space context to 
try to define it. International Space Activities, 1979: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Space Science and Applications of the House Comm. on Science and 
Technology, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 96-97 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Int'l Space Ac-
tivities]. 
40. 105 CONG. REC. A1822 (1959). 
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ing principles, the facts and circumstances may require a more in-
stitutionalized arrangement. Establishment of an international 
agency or authority, with defined powers and procedures41 to 
govern exploitation of the natural resources of the moon, should 
provide a needed control on behalf of all States. It would also 
serve to protect the biosphere42 and the existing balance of the en-
vironment as well as assure equitable sharing in the benefits 
derived from the exploited resources. 
The esteemed Honorary Director of the International In-
stitute of Space Law and founder of the Association of United 
States Members of the International Institute of Space Law, Mrs. 
Eilene Galloway, in recent testimony during a U.S. Senate sub-
committee Hearing on the TOM observed: 
The problem posed by the Moon Treaty is how to translate 
general guidelines that express value judgments into practical 
arrangements for the operation of scientific and technical 
facilities. And beyond that, how should fair arrangements be 
worked out between national and international relationships?43 
B. The Role of the International Regime 
It will be in the international regime, and appropriate pro-
cedures, agreed upon in the contemplated subsequent interna-
tional agreement44 that will ultimately determine the breadth of 
the TOM's CHM and equitable sharing principle. While this agree-
ment may be extremely difficult to conclude,45 deferment of mak-
41. See Menter, Legal Regime of International Flight. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST COL-
LOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 126, 130-132 (1978). (This reference is to a discussion of 
utilizing the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as an model for future inter-
national control of space flight). 
42. See TOM, supra note 1, art. 7, para. 1. 
43. The Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 29, at 179. 
44. While the language in the TOM is not explicit as to a subsequent separate treaty, 
the negotiated history has several such recitals. For example, in his statement to the 
COPUOS Legal Subcommittee concerning the natural resources of the moon under the pro-
posal advanced by the U.S. relative to exploitation of the natural resources of the moon, 
Herbert Reis, the U.S. Representative to the Subcommittee, observed: "Finally, we would 
need to contemplate a special treaty-drafting conference in the event of the discovery of 
commercially exploitable resources .... " A similar recital for a separate treaty was also 
made by Ambassador Richard W. Petree in his remarks on Nov. 1, 1979 to the U.N. General 
Assembly Special Political Committee, supra note 28, at 6. 
45. Aside from the nature and procedures to be determined, there will be many other 
matters to be considered. For example, should benefit sharing be extended to activities to 
which the exploited resources are applied? If so, should a space station utilizing moon 
materials in its construction and operation be included? Does it extend to raw products and 
finished manufactured items from such space station? It should be noted that in response to 
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ing the determinations involved permits, at this time, the accep-
tance of the TOM principles and direction for international 
cooperation in undertaking activities on or about the moon, in-
cluding research and development efforts for new products and 
processes, space stations and habitats and ascertainment of the 
feasibility of commercial exploitation of the natural resources of 
the moon. It is to be hoped that data will be forthcoming to pro-
vide a firm basis for specificity as to the type of international 
regime to be established and for defining the equitable sharing in 
exploitable resources. 
It has been the reported position of some States and at-
torneys that exploitation of the natural resources of the moon 
would not be lawful under the present state of Space Law.46 The 
doubt that has existed as to lawfulness of exploitation of the 
moon's resources will be removed by the TOM's providing for 
such exploitation. It is to be hoped that this provision will en-
courage private sect9r investment in such endeavors. The need to 
encourage such investment has been noted as a must item for 
subsequent conferences seeking to establish the international 
regime.47 
VL PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE MOON 
A. General Prohibition 
It may be noted that under the text of then Article X of the 
draft TOM, as adopted in 1973 by the COPUOS Legal Subcommit-
tee Working Group, the wording of paragraph 2 read in pertinent 
part: "Neither the surface of the moon, nor, subject to the provi-
sions of Article V, paragraph 2, their parts and natural resources 
shall become the property of any State, international intergovern-
mental or non-governmental organization, national organization or 
non-governmental entity, or any natural person." 48 
The referenced Article V, Paragraph 2, was to expressly 
authorize "the right to collect on and remove from the moon 
a question by Senator Stevenson. during previously referred to Hearings on July 29, 1980, 
as to whether exploitation benefits would extend to a space station not on the moon, the 
Legal Adviser of the Department of State. Robert B. Owens, advised that it would not as 
the Moon Treaty took express note of the COPUOS interpretation that space objects in 
earth orbit only are not within the TOM (See Report of the COPUOS, supra note 14, at 11, 
para. 63). 
46. The Moon Treaty Hearings. supra note 29 at 9 (statement of Robert B. Owens). 
47. Reis. supra note 24. at 6. 
48. COPUOS Legal Subcomm .• supra note 25. at 19. 
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samples of its mineral and other substances," and, "in the course 
of scientific investigations also use minerals and other substances 
of the moon in quantities appropriate for the support of their mis-
sions."49 It is apparent from the above quotations that the sole ex-
ploitation to be permitted was the removal of samples, and addi-
tional amounts of minerals and other substances appropriate for 
the support of scientific missions. 
B. The Exploitation Exception 
1. THE U.S. "IN PLACE" AMENDMENT 
To ensure that the above phraseology would not preclude ex-
ploitation, removal and ownership of exploited resources for other 
than scientific investigation, the U.S. Delegate at the 1973 Legal 
Subcommittee session, on April 17th, advanced an amending pro-
posal to have the opening sentence of the above quoted then 
paragraph 2 of Article X, read: "Neither the surface nor the sub-
surface of the moon or other celestial bodies, nor any area thereof 
or natural resources in p/,ace shall become the property of ... " 
etc. The deletion of the phrase "subject to the provisions of Arti-
cle V" eliminated the limited authorization for removal of only 
samples and mineral and other substances in support of scientific 
investigations. The addition of the words "in place" was explained 
by the U.S. Representative at the Subcommittee session: "to in-
dicate that the prohibition against assertion of property rights 
would not apply to natural resources once red.uced to possession 
through exploitation either in the preregime period or, subject to 
the rules and procedures that a regime would constitute, following 
the establishment of the regime ... "50 (emphasis added). 
The U.S. amendment was accepted and such recital con-
stitutes Article II, paragraph 3 of the TOM. While a reader 
without knowledge of the negotiated history may question that 
the paragraph reflects authority to exploit and to own resources 
removed, such intent being clearly reflected in the negotiated 
history must govern.51 
49. Id. at 50. 
50. Id. at 16. This was the April 17, 1973 U.S. proposed amendment to the then Arti-
cle X. TOM. To explain the words "in place," see Hosenball, The United Nations Committee 
011 the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Past Accomplishments and Future Challenges, 7 J. 
SPACE L. 95. 103 (1979). 
51. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 30, at art. 31, para. 4; art. 
32. 
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2. APPLICABILITY TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
As the words "non-governmental entity or any natural per-
son" were in the enumeration immediately following the insertion 
of the words "in place", the exploitation authorization and 
resulting ownership authority conveyed would appear to equally 
extend to the private sector, subject to requirements elsewhere in 
the TOM such as "only under the authority and continuing super-
vision of the appropriate State Party" recital of Article 14. This, 
however, is not an onerous limitation since all enterprises are re-
quired to meet applicable legislative regulatory government 
agency directives, for example, licensing and supervision of com-
mercial air carriers, and coal mining. 
C. Assurances to Industry 
Industry need not fear an uncertainty premised on the asser-
tions of some critics of the TOM that there is a moratorium on ex-
ploitation of the moon's resources. This apprehension is nurtured 
by a strained construction of Article 11, paragraph 5 which recites 
that States Parties "hereby undertake to establish an inter-
national regime ... to govern the exploitation of the natural 
resources of the moon as such exploitation is about to become 
feasible." The negotiated history of the TOM, by recitals in the of-
ficial record of the CO PO US and of the UN General Assembly, 
confirm that no moratorium is intended. Specific proposals for a 
moratorium in the course of the negotiations failed to obtain the 
required consensus. The consensus finally achieved on the last day 
of the COPUOS 1979 session resulted from a compromise in which 
the more limited CHM recital was accepted upon an express 
withdrawal of a proposal calling for deferment of exploitation 
pending the establishment of an international regime to govern 
such exploitation.52 The UN General Assembly, in its Resolution53 
commending the TOM and requesting that it be opened for 
signature at the UN, took specific note of the recital in the 1979 
COPUOS Report that "the Committee agreed that Article 7 is not 
intended to result in prohibiting the exploitation of natural 
resources which may be found on celestial bodies other than the 
earth .... "54 
52. Press Release, supra note 35, at 7; Hosenball, supra note 50, at 100. 
53. TOM, supra note l, at 1. 
54. Report of the COPUOS, supra note 13, at 11, para. 65. 
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VIL COMMERCIAL SPACE ACTIVITY 
A. General 
As previously indicated, several provisions of the TOM and 
the prior OST pertain to space activity by the private sector. 
While the TOM applies to activities relating to the moon and other 
celestial bodies, and to orbits around and other trajectories to or 
around them, the OST also includes all other space activities.55 In 
the latter, the private sector generally would not be concerned 
with the TOM CHM and international regime limitation problems. 
However, both the TOM and prior space law treaties impose 
obligations and provide benefits to the private sector. The follow-
ing discussion concerns the relationship between the . private sec-
tor and government in their space activities, including obligations 
and benefits. Recitals herein shall include referral to the OST and 
other space law treaties believed appropriate. 
B. Government Responsibility for Commercial Sector in Space 
Both the TOM and the OST provide that Parties to the 
respective agreements shall bear international responsibility for 
"national activities" on the moon whether such activities are car-
ried out by governmental agencies "or by non-governmental en-
tities," and for assuring that national activities are carried out in 
conformity with the provisions of the international agreements.56 
These articles are designed to ensure responsibility for space ac-
tivities, inherently international in nature, at the governmental 
level. The OST and the Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects57 are concerned with damage 
caused by space objects, but have limited application to damage 
occuring on the Moon. This is recognized by the TOM, which en-
visages future consideration of further liability principles being 
formulated during the later review conferences contemplated of 
the TOM.58 
Compensation for injuries or damages may be presently 
available under a State's domestic legislation. In the United 
States, authority is provided the Administrator of NASA and the 
55. OST, supra note 2, at art. 1. 
56. TOM, supra note 1, at art. 14, para. 1; OST, supra note 2, at arts. VI, VII. 
57. See note 2, supra. 
58. See TOM, supra note 1, at art. 14, para. 2. 
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Secretaries of the military departments to administratively settle 
claims arising out of space activities.59 
C. Jurisdiction and Control of Personnel and Objects in Space 
Each State Party to the TOM retains "jurisdiction and con-
trol" over its nationals, their space vehicles, equipment, facilities, 
stations and installations on the nioon.60 Similar jurisdiction under 
the OST over an object launched into outer space and the person-
nel (including foreigners) abroad, on a celestial body or otherwise 
in outer space, is retained by the State on whose registry the 
launched object is carried.61 This imposes on a State the require-
ment to ensure that it possesses the necessary legal authority to 
exercise such jurisdiction and control. Of course, the State of 
Registry could waive its jurisdiction in a particular case where 
another State, under the international law, may also have jurisdic-
tion. Under the "nationality principle," a State may extend its 
jurisdiction over offenses by its nationals wherever they occur. 
A sovereign is obligated under international law to protect 
its own and foreign personnel lawfully under its jurisdiction. The 
U.S. Congress is considering enactment of legislation to extend 
U.S. criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed aboard U.S. 
launched spacecraft and at places otherwise "outside the jurisdic-
tion of any nation" where the offenses are committed "by or 
against a national of the United States."62 This jurisdiction, of 
course, would embrace offenses on the moon or otherwise in outer 
space. While more specific recitals in the U.S. Criminal Code are 
59. Claims to $25,000 may be settled within the agencies; claims above $25,000, deem-
ed meritorious, may be certified to the U.S. Comptroller General or to the Congress for pay-
ment consideration. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2733, 2734 (1976). 
60. TOM, supra note 1, at art. 12, para. 1. 
61. OST, supra note 2, at art. VIII. 
62. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980). The proposed "Criminal Code Reform Act of 
1980" was favorably reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, with amendments, on 
January 17, 1980. Its House counterpart, H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980) was 
favorably reported out of the House Judiciary Committee on July 2, 1980. While the short 
time remaining of the 96th Congress precluded resolution of differences between the Senate 
and House versions before adjournment the measure is certain to be reintroduced with likely 
enactment by the 97th Congress. A new, more limited measure is already under considera-
tion as the "National Aeronautics and Space Authorization Act, 1982." H.R. 1257, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). This measure includes a proposed amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1976), 
by adding a subparagraph 6 thereto, to extend the Special Maritime and Territorial 
Jurisdiction of the United States to space flight. For a discussion of this possible approach, 
see Menter, Jurisdiction Over Man-Made Orbital Satellites, 2 J. SPACE L. 19, 22 (1974). 
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being sought, the NASA Administrator, under authority dele-
gated to him in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,68 
as amended, on March 7, 1980, issued regulations vesting "abso-
lute authority" in the Commander of the Space Shuttle to enforce 
order and discipline during all phases of a Shuttle flight, including 
authority to take action believed necessary for the protection, 
safety, and well-being of all personnel and on-board equipment and 
payloads.84 A violation of the Shuttle Commander's orders would 
subject the offender to a fine of up to $5,000 or imprisonment for 
one year, or both.85 Further note is made that under existing U.S. 
law pertaining to active duty military personnel, such personnel 
are subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice for offenses committed thereunder wherever per-
forming assigned duties.66 The above recitals, of course, also em-
brace personnel of the private sector participating in space ac-
tivities. 
D. Ownership of Property in Space 
Under Article 12 of the TOM, the private entrepreneur re-
tains ownership of his space vehicle, equipment, facilities, stations 
and installations on the moon. Such property and personnel of the 
employer are to be accorded the benefits provided astronauts by 
Article V of the OST67 and provided for space objects by the 
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of 
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched Into Outer 
Space.68 Thus, if under the stated circumstances, personnel or pro-
perty of a private company is found by another State Party to the 
TOM in other than its intended location on the moon, it should be 
rescued and returned to the responsible State or its represen-
tative. The latter State is to bear the expenses incurred in 
recovery and return of the property.69 In the event of an emergen-
cy involving threat to the lives of such personnel, they may use 
the facilities and equipment of any State Party on the Moon.70 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2455(a) (1976). 
64. 45 Fed. Reg. 14,845 (1980) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 1214.7). 
65. 18 u.s.c. § 799 (1976). 
66. 10 u.s.c. § 802 (1976). 
67. TOM, supra note 1, at art. 10, para. 1. 
68. Return of Astronauts Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 5. 
69. Id. at art. 5, para. 5. 
70. TOM, supra note 1, at art. 10, para. 2; art. 12, para. 3. 
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VIII THE ERA AHEAD: 
OBLIGATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
A. Equity Responsibilities 
The moon and its natural resources are recited in Article 11 
of the TOM as the CHM. Yet under the TOM, neither mankind, 
nor all States are entitled to share in the benefits of exploitation. 
The 'equitable sharing' is provided only for State Parties to the 
TOM. Such States are expressly precluded by paragraph 3 of Arti-
cle 11 from having property rights in either the surface or subsur-
face of the moon. Ownership is provided over natural resources of 
the moon only when no longer "in place." Such ownership accrues 
to the successful exploiting State. The equitable sharing provided 
for is not of the resources exploited, nor a division "of' the 
benefits derived from the resources. Only a sharing "in" the 
benefits derived "from" the resources are required. This appears 
a more limited concept than mankind's common ownership of the 
moon and its resources. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "equitable," in part, as "just, 
fair and right, in consideration of the facts and circumstances of 
the individual case."71 The Dictionary narrates that Justinian is 
said to have defined 'equity' as "to live honestly, to harm nobody 
and to render every man his due."72 While the subsequent agree-
ment for an international regime may establish criteria, it is con-
ceivable that the share "due" to a non-contributing State may be 
determined to be zero. However, whether the OST concepts or a 
formula for a greater sharing in the benefits will govern must 
await the subsequent treaty. If a State Party to the TOM does not 
accept the subsequent treaty, it nevertheless remains obligated in 
carrying out its activities with the respect to the natural 
resources of the moon to do so in a manner compatible with the 
purposes sought by the international regime specified in Article 
11, paragraph 7, of the TOM, including the "equitable sharing" 
principle. 
In a recent presentation, Dr. Stephen Doyle, Program 
Manager for Telecommunications, Information and Space Studies 
of the Of~ice of Technology, U.S. Congress, characterized the most 
recent of the evolutionary phases of Space Law as the "extrater-
71. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 482 (5th ed. 1979). 
72. Id. at 484. 
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restrial law phase." He marks its beginning with the UN General 
Assembly promulgation of the TOM in December 1979. The im-
plementation of the new regime of "common heritage" is recited as 
a "major problem that will demand the best and most creative of 
our skills." He observed that the 19th century model of explora-
tion and conflict cannot be tolerated in the 21st century. He states 
however, that "it must be understood that if there is to be no 
dominion by a few countries, there must be no dominion by the 
majority .... " "Equity" is stated as the "key concept" for realizing 
the use and benefit of space which is to be available to all nations 
regardless of their levels of economic development. "But that," Dr. 
Doyle states, "should not be read to mean that every nation has a 
right to share equally in benefits regardless of contribution." He 
further observed that "opportunities must be nondiscriminatory 
and there must be a possibility for all to contribute to and share in 
endeavors in space. Returns, however, must reflect contributions. 
There is no 'free lunch' ."73 
B. Private Sector Investment Encouraged 
In the recent Congressional hearing on U.S. Civil Space 
Policy, the President of the Northrop Corporation, Dr. Thomas 0. 
Paine, a prior Administrator of NASA, narrated successful past 
and present ventures of private enterprise in space activities. He 
urged establishment of goals for the future, observing: 
Private enterprise has now raised and invested more than 
$1 billion in orbiting comsats, with a growth trend that indicates 
doubling in the next few years. In similar fashion, satellite 
remote sensing has grown ... , initiating another new space in-
dustry7' ... , the routine conduct of opportunistic research in 
laboratories in space is an activity whose time has come .... We 
need to explore new ideas that utilize the availability of un-
limited energy, ready sources of lunar and asteroidal materials75 
.... Now is the time to plan and initiate work on the essential in-
itial orbiting bases.76 
73. S.E. Doyle, Significant Developments in Space Law: A Projection for the Next 
Decade (April 21, 1980) (a paper presented at the University of Mississippi Law Center 
Symposium on "Space Law in Perspective"). 
74. United States Civilian Space Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Space 
Science and Applications of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 96th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. 9 (1980) (statement of Dr. Thomas 0. Paine). 
75. Id. at 13. 
76. Id. at 14. 
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Dr. Paine further testified that we should continue to promote in-
ternational participation in major space ventures as a positive 
step in maintenance of peace among the major powers, the further 
application of space systems to raise living standards around the 
world, and the sharing of costs and benefits of space activities 
among all countries. 77 Mr. S. Neil Hosenball, the General Counsel 
of NASA, chaired the U.S. Delegation to the 1979 CO PU OS ses-
sion. In testifying in House of Representatives Hearings on "In-
ternational Space Activities, 1979," he observed that a review of 
the total records of the TOM negotiations over seven years clearly 
establishes that there has not been any limitation imposed on the 
commercial exploitation of the lunar surfaces or celestial body 
resources and that "nothing in the treaty in any way restricts 
such activity being carried out by industry, by private commercial 
entities."78 Recitals of the Treaty have been categorized as "incen-
tives" by Ambassador Richard W. Petree, U.S. Deputy Represen-
tative to the UN Security Council. He observed that by setting 
forth in Article 11, paragraph 7, the purposes governing exploita-
tion of natural resources, "uncertainty is decreased and both State 
and private entities may now find it possible to engage in the ar-
duous and expensive efforts necessary if exploitation of the 
natural resources is ever to become a reality."79 
C. Cl,arification of "Equitably Sharing" 
The difficulty and importance to the international community 
of attaining the later agreement for an international regime is ap-
parent. Realism would suggest a pragmatic approach by all in-
terests. Without adequate inducement to States and, where ap-
plicable, to their "non-governmental entities" concerned, the effort 
to determine feasibility of moon resources exploration will falter. 
In countries where the private sector plays a predominant role in 
industrial production on a profit basis, such sectors must be 
assured that the risk is reasonable and within permissive limits. 
It is believed that the early fears expressed by the private 
sector have been exaggerated. Nor should a requirement to share 
profits, should such extreme determination be within the authori-
ty of the international regime, itself be the sole basis of the 
private sector's refusal to advance risk capital in a national 
77. Id. at 16. 
78. Int'l Space Activities, supra note 39, at 95 (testimony of S.N. Hosenball). 
79. Press Release, supra note 35. 
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endeavor for exploitation of the natural resources of the moon. 
U.S. industry has not declined participation in foreign government 
ventures with sharing of profits in high risk situations, such as in 
petroleum endeavors, viz: oil drilling, exploration, processing or 
refinement, production and distribution. Neither has it declined to 
risk capital in payment to the United States for leases to explore 
for oil in US owned lands, including seabeds and mountain shale, 
or for mineral rights exploration. 
As previously indicated, it will be many years before exploita-
tion of the moon's resources becomes feasible. It is reasonable to 
assume that costs involved would be recouped before any 
equitable sharing may begin. At the later exploitation stage, could 
not the sharing of profits be construed as a condition for participa-
tion in the project similar to the referenced foreign petroleum ven-
tures, or as an overhead cost akin, in part, to overhead rental for 
the exclusive moon area utilized. As such exploitation is a national 
activity under the TOM, should not some tax considerations be ac-
corded by the sponsoring government? 
D. Government-Industry Cooperation 
The great success of the United States space effort has been 
based upon the close cooperation between Government and in-
dustry. The Government policy is to retain a major space research 
and development endeavor until it becomes commercially feasible. 
Turnover to the private sector at that time would not necessarily 
terminate further research and development by the Government 
in such area. While the Government funds its research program, it 
calls upon industry to share in c,oncept development and to pro-
duce and test necessary hardware. 
In the development of a national capability to exploit the 
moon's resources, Governments will employ their industrial 
capability to achieve their goals. Costs therefore will primarily be 
borne by Government whether functioning through governmental 
or non-governmental entities. Additional incentives to industry 
may be manifold, e.g., study grants, cost plus payments, and loan 
guarantees. In a recent legislative proposal, for example, Con-
gressman Donald Fuqua, Chairman of the Committee on Science 
and Technology of the House of Representatives, has proposed 
legislation to encourage private sector interest in space activities 
participation. This measure, H.R. 7 412, 96th Congress, 2nd Ses-
sion, introduced on May 21, 1980, sought to establish a "Space In-
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dustrialization Corporation" to provide Government secured in-
vestment capital for high technology space ventures which other-
wise may exceed acceptable risk to private sector elements.80 
Chairman Fuqua has recently written that prospects for fur-
ther improvement of goods and services "will move nations to ex-
panded uses of the space environment that will reap countless 
economic and societal benefits."81 He further observed: "We are on 
the threshold of industrializing space and the role of private enter-
prise will determine the success of these endeavors .... "82 
E. Government Leadership and Support 
Nations in the past, whatever their ideology, have not 
hesitated to bear the majority of, if not all, expenses incident to 
desired high risk endeavors. Where private enterprise exists, 
governments have tailored legislation on the subject concerned as 
an inducement for private sector participation (e.g., in shipping, 
railroading, air carrier transportation, and atomic energy). 
In the United States, both the Executive and Legislative 
branches of the Government are currently evaluating concepts to 
induce private sector participation in space activities. It is incum-
bent upon the private sector to advise the Government of its in-
terests, capabilities and limitations as specific activities are ad-
dressed (including, should the U.S. become a Party to the TOM, 
recommendations for the future treaty to provide an international 
regime to govern exploitation of the natural resources of the 
moon). The Government in turn must assure industry protection 
from unacceptable risk until economic feasibility is apparent. 
F. U.S. Consideration of Acceptance of the TOM 
While U.S. leadership was the moving force in the UN's 
80. H.R. 7412, supra note 11, was introduced on May 21, 1980 by Congressman Fuqua 
for himself and fifteen others. It was to have been cited on enactment as the "Space In-
dustrialization Act of 1980." The bill provided for the establishment of a Space Industrial 
Corporation to promote new products, processes, services, and industries using the proper-
ties of space technology. The measure sought to provide a high degree of assurance that the 
private entity could depend upon security in handling competitive information, private 
ownership of patent and proprietary data, and the ultimate sharing in the benefits of the 
competitive venture. H.R. 7412 was a successor bill to H.R. 2337, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., also 
introduced by Congressman Fuqua. 
81. Fuqua, Space Industrialization: Some Legal and Policy Considerations for 
Private Enterprise, 8 J. SPACE L. l, 2 (1980). 
82. Id. 
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favorable consideration and endorsement of the TOM, it is pro-
bable that the contending interpretations discussed above will 
preclude the U.S. from becoming a Party at the time of the TOM's 
entrance into force. The caution of private industry towards com-
mitment of substantial capital in risk ventures before clear resolu-
tion of contending issues in exploitation of the moon's natural 
resources is recognized. Involved are questions of the validity of 
exploitation, title to (ownership of) exploited resources, possible 
sharing (CHM) of resulting benefits, role and time of coming into 
effect of the proposed regulatory regime, and the obligation of 
private sector participants if the international regime is not -
established. 
Granted that the wording of the TOM raises. serious ques-
tions as to interpretation, it is believed that the negotiated history 
of the TOM does substantiate the meaning intended by its 
drafters which accords with the prior Space Law treaties and is in 
the interest of U.S. private enterprise and the world community. 
To assure that the issues raised are consistently resolved in 
accord with the meaning of terms and intent reflected in the 
negotiated history, the author suggests that the U.S. in actions 
supporting the TOM- such as in signing the TOM and/or during 
the Senate ratification process- should set forth its written 
"understanding" of each of the contending issues with reference to 
the negotiated history substantiating its conclusions. These 
"understandings," under customary international law as well as 
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, are con-
sidered as reservations.83 Thus, an objection by another State 
adherent must specifically reject the U.S. recital of understanding 
to preclude entrance of the Treaty into force between them. If no 
such objection is made within one year, the U.S. understanding is 
deemed accepted. 
G. For All Mankind 
In the interests of avoiding seeds for conflict encountered 
through history on Earth, the world community tailored the OST 
to a new set of legal principles proclaiming outer space and its 
celestial bodies as the province of all mankind and that its explora-
tion and use shall be carried out for the benefit of all peoples. 
83. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 30, at art. 19; art. 20, paras. 
4(b), 5; art. 23. 
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Space activities, since the OST came into force in 1967, have 
brought great benefits to the world community. The private sec-
tor has participated and profited. It is believed that rather than 
limit private sector opportunities, the TOM will enhance them by 
opening new vistas with rewards, as in the past, dependent upon 
initiative, ingenuity and industrial capability, with government 
support tailored to high risk endeavors. 
Continued international accord is essential for preventing 
friction in space. This is of equal concern to all States. Greater par-
ticipation of non-space powers in space activity should better 
ensure bringing to fruition its many benefits for all mankind. Such 
cooperation should further assure peaceful coexistence in space 
and on our Spaceship Earth. 
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